Guseltseva M.S. Review of the article by Orly Shenker “Modelling Thought Versus Modelling the Brain”
Marina S. Guseltseva, Sc.D. (Psychology), Associate professor, Federal Scientific Center for Psychological and Interdisciplinary Research (Psychological Institute), Moscow, Russia; bld. 9–4, Mokhovaya str., Moscow, Russia, 125009; mguseltseva@mail.ru
In the article “Modelling Thought Versus Modelling the Brain”, Orly Shenker, a professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, discusses the relationship between modeling thought and modeling the brain. The essence of modeling is to abstract away all unnecessary elements (i.e., non-essential features and properties) while preserving the essential ones. According to the computational theory of consciousness, thought is understood as computation, and this is considered one of its most significant characteristics. However, the same computation can occur in physically heterogeneous systems – an idea known in the philosophy of mind as “Multiple Realizability”. This concept suggests that a particular mental property, event, or state can be realized in a variety of physical forms.
In her article, Orly Shenker argues that the consistent development of the idea of multiple realizability leads to a dualism of mind and body. She also examines how this conclusion influences the understanding of which essential characteristics of thought should be preserved in modeling within neuroscience.
The article aims to explore the connection between modeling thought and modeling the brain, as well as to critique the concept of multiple realizability. O. Shenker employs methods of philosophical reasoning and comparative analysis.
Her reflections lead to the conclusion that the ideas of multiple realizability, despite their prevalence and appeal in neuroscience, require revision and justification. O. Shenker argues that accurate modeling of thought is hardly possible in modern science. First, when modeling thought using computers, computational properties cannot be preserved if the material features of the brain are eliminated. Second, computational processes occurring on a computer are not relevant to the cognitive processes in the human brain.
Key words: physicalism, non-reductive physicalism, models, reduction, multiple realizability, computation, computational theory of mind, dualism
For citation: Guseltseva, M.S. (2025). Review of the article by Orly Shenker “Modelling Thought Versus Modelling the Brain”. New Psychological Research, No. 1, 265–274. DOI: 10.51217/npsyresearch_2025_05_01_12
Acknowledgment
The article was prepared within a state task, project FNRE-2024-0016.
Keywords: physicalism non-reductive physicalism models reduction multiple realizability computation computational theory of mind dualism
Received: 08th april 2025
Published: 08th april 2025